



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
 










MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 42) 
 
Case No. 2:18-cv-00955 
 
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg 
 
Plaintiffs Markie Lloyd and Natalia Shaw brought this action against their former 
employer, Overstock.com, Inc. (“Overstock”), alleging disability discrimination and retaliation 
under the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.  
(See Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. No. 2.)  Plaintiffs asserted claims for failure to accommodate, disparate 
treatment, disparate impact, and retaliation.  (Compl. ¶¶ 92–119, Doc. No. 2.)  Overstock moved 
for summary judgment on all claims.  (Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”), Doc. No. 42.)  Plaintiffs 
opposed the motion in part, choosing not to pursue several claims.  (Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to 
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opp’n”), Doc. No. 46.)  The court held a hearing on the motion on 
November 1, 2021.  (See Doc. No. 53.)   
For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.  The 
court1 grants the motion as to the claims Plaintiffs have chosen not to pursue: Ms. Lloyd’s 
failure-to-accommodate claim and Plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claims.  The court denies the 
 
1 The parties consent to proceed before a magistrate judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) 
and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  (Doc. No. 12.) 
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motion as to all other claims: Ms. Shaw’s failure-to-accommodate claim, Plaintiffs’ disparate-
treatment claims, and Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.   
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Courts grant summary judgment only where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “A fact is ‘material’ if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the 
outcome of the lawsuit.”  Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if a rational jury could 
find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views “the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s 
favor.”  Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 2015).  But, “where the non moving party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue that party must go beyond the 
pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party’s case in order to survive summary judgment.”  
McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
RELEVANT FACTS 
The court considers the following facts in determining the motion for summary judgment.  
All facts come from the parties’ briefs and accompanying exhibits.  The court draws all 
reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties.  
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The Content Moderation Team 
Former Overstock president Stormy Simon identified the Content Moderation Team 
(“CMT”) as a department which could accommodate people who needed to work from home, 
including people with disabilities such as multiple sclerosis (“MS”).  (MSJ, Background and 
Context Facts ¶¶ 2, 4, Doc. No. 42; Opp’n, Pls.’ Statement of Add’l Undisputed Material Facts 
(“SAUMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. No. 46.)  Because website reviews were submitted all day and required 
constant moderation, content moderators could work from home with no set schedule and 
flexible hours.  (SAUMF ¶¶ 1–2.)  Beginning around 2012, Ms. Simon worked with the local 
MS society to identify and recruit potential employees with MS to work on the CMT.  (Id. ¶ 4.)  
Ms. Simon took a leave of absence in June 2016, and she resigned as president of Overstock in 
July 2016.  (Id. ¶ 19.)  Ms. Simon testified she was concerned that after she left, Overstock 
would undo what she had created.  (Ex. 3 to Opp’n, Dep. of Stormy Simon (“Simon Dep.”) 
83:11–25, Doc. No. 46-4.) 
On June 24, 2016, Nariman Noursalehi, Senior Vice President of Marketing, emailed all 
CMT employees to announce he was ending the CMT’s work-from-home program.  (MSJ, 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶ 19, Doc. No. 42; Ex. K to MSJ, Noursalehi 
Email (June 24, 2016), Doc. No. 42-12.)  The email stated Mr. Noursalehi had decided to “cease 
the practice of working from home in a permanent/indefinite role,” and “all full-time employees 
will need to complete their scheduled work week in the office beginning Tuesday July 5th.”  
(Noursalehi Email, Doc. No. 42-12.)  The email provided, “We can still be flexible at times, but 
any work performed outside the office and/or normal working hours will need prior approval 
from your direct supervisor, and will be handled on a case by case basis.”  (Id.)   




Ms. Shaw, who has MS, was recruited by Ms. Simon through the MS society and began 
working for Overstock as a content moderator in December 2012.  (SUMF ¶¶ 1–2, Doc. No. 42; 
Opp’n, Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“RSUMF”) ¶ 2, Doc. No. 46.)  Ms. 
Shaw was supervised by Jardy Stokes, her direct supervisor, and Neal Lutz, the CMT manager.  
(See SUMF ¶ 6(a), (e), Doc. No. 42.)  Mr. Stokes understood Ms. Shaw worked from home 
because she had MS.  (Ex. 5 to Opp’n, Dep. of Jardy Stokes (“Stokes Dep.”) 82:5–9, Doc. No. 
46-6.)  Mr. Lutz was aware Ms. Shaw worked from home “because of a disability or medical 
condition” and sometimes couldn’t drive because of it.  (Ex. 14 to Opp’n, Dep. of Neal Lutz 
(“Lutz Dep.”) 52:24–54:13, Doc. No. 46-15.)   
According to Mr. Lutz, Ms. Shaw’s productivity was low, and she “didn’t let [Mr. 
Stokes] know her hours very much, even though he requested that she do so and check in every 
day.”  (Id. at 41:16–18, 85:17–19.)  On June 15, 2016, Mr. Lutz and Mr. Stokes discussed going 
through the disciplinary process to begin the “formalities” of terminating Ms. Shaw and another 
employee but, instead, sought approval from their supervisors to end the work-from-home 
policy.  (Ex. 21 to Opp’n, Lutz Email to Killinger (June 15, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 3–4.)  Mr. 
Lutz emailed his supervisors that he and Mr. Stokes believed ending the work-from-home policy 
“might be the best solution for everyone, including them [(the employees in question)].”  (Id.)  
He stated, “We feel very strongly that neither of them will make the choice to come in to the 
office and work, and thus it solves that problem.”  (Id.)   
Mr. Lutz drafted the email announcing the end of the work-from-home policy—the same 
email Mr. Noursalehi ultimately sent to all CMT employees on June 24.  (Ex. 21 to Opp’n, Lutz 
Email to Noursalehi (June 20, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 2.)  After drafting the email, Mr. Lutz 
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told Mr. Noursalehi that “[t]his week feels like a perpetual Christmas Eve for [Mr. Stokes] and I 
as we await the joy (or lack thereof) that will come to individuals upon receiving it.”  (Ex. 21 to 
Opp’n, Lutz Email to Noursalehi (June 23, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 1–2.)   
On June 23, Ms. Shaw was given a final written warning for performance issues, 
including poor communication.  (Ex. 33 to Opp’n, Shaw Final Warning, Doc. No. 46-34.)  The 
warning stated Ms. Shaw could “no longer work from home and is expected to work in the 
office,” and would be given an unexcused absence “[i]f unable to come in.”  (Id.)   
Ms. Shaw testified that after receiving the final warning, she made requests to Mr. Stokes 
and Mr. Lutz to continue working from home.  (Ex. 2 to Opp’n, Dep. of Natalia Shaw (“Shaw 
Dep.”) 36:22–37:19, 38:14–39:10, 43:17–20, Doc. No. 46-3.)  She told Mr. Stokes she couldn’t 
come into the office because she was too sick to drive and because working in an office was too 
hard for her to manage.  (Id. at 38:20–23, 39:9–10, 43:17–20.)  She reminded him that Stormy 
Simon hired her into a work-from-home position and she had always worked from home.  (Id. at 
38:23–25.)  Mr. Stokes told Ms. Shaw she would be fired if she did not go into the office.  (Id. at 
39:2–3; Ex. 4 to Opp’n, Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  
Ms. Shaw was terminated on June 29, 2016.  (Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  
Her termination letter stated Ms. Shaw had been given a final warning and “was told she could 
no longer work from home and must report to the office.”  (Id.)  It stated Ms. Shaw was told to 
“report to the office by Wednesday 6/29/2016 at 9:00 AM, or we would proceed with 
termination,” and that she “did not report to work.”  (Id.)  The letter also stated Ms. Shaw had 
seventeen unexcused absences in the final six months of her employment.  (Id.)   
Ms. Simon, Ms. Shaw, Ms. Lloyd, and another employee testified that content 
moderators had flexible schedules without set hours and did not have to be logged into the 
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system at any specific time.  (Ex. 1 to Opp’n, Dep. of Amanda Leary (“Leary Dep.”) 7:24–8:17, 
Doc. No. 46-2; Shaw Dep. 26:8–22, Doc. No. 46-3; Simon Dep. 98:20–99:13, Doc. No. 46-4; 
Ex. 8 to Opp’n, Dep. of Markie Lloyd (“Lloyd Dep.”) 35:14–23, Doc. No. 46-9.)   
Ms. Lloyd 
Ms. Lloyd was hired by Overstock as a customer service agent in October 2011.  (SUMF 
¶ 7, Doc. No. 42.)  After being diagnosed with MS and missing time at work due to her illness, 
Ms. Lloyd transferred to the CMT in 2014.  (Id.; RSUMF ¶ 8, Doc. No. 46.)  Mr. Stokes 
expressed frustration that employees such as Ms. Lloyd were “dumped” on his team when they 
were not performing well in other positions.  (Stokes Dep. 17:19–23, 19:18–19, 22:3–13, Doc. 
No. 46-6.)  He testified he had a difficult time working with Ms. Lloyd because “it felt like her 
health issues only were an issue when it was something I wanted her to do.”  (Id. at 97:22–25.)  
In Mr. Lutz’s email recommending ending the work-from-home policy, he stated Ms. Lloyd was 
not a “star player” and he would be excited to replace her if she chose to resign.  (Lutz Email to 
Killinger (June 15, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 3.)   
After receiving Mr. Noursalehi’s email ending the work-from-home policy, Ms. Lloyd 
asked Mr. Stokes if she could carpool to a closer location.  (Ex. 23 to Opp’n, Lloyd Chat with 
Stokes (June 28, 2016), Doc. No. 46-24.)  Mr. Stokes denied her request and required Ms. Lloyd 
to work in the main office or not at all.  (Id.; Stokes Dep. 99:14–100:3, Doc. No. 46-6; Lloyd 
Dep. 150:21–151:15, Doc. No. 46-9.)  Ms. Lloyd was unaware of Overstock’s procedures for 
accommodation requests, so she instead applied for leave under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (“FMLA”).  (Lloyd Dep. 148:13–20, 149:14–150:14, Doc. No. 46-9; Ex. 11 to Opp’n, Lloyd 
Email to Stokes (July 5, 2016), Doc. No. 46-12.)  On July 5, 2016, she informed Mr. Stokes that 
her doctor advised her not to drive and “suggested that I see about talking to someone in HR 
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about working from home before she completely fills out my [FMLA] paperwork because my 
MS has been relapsing more.”  (Lloyd Email to Stokes (July 5, 2016), Doc. No. 46-12.)  She also 
texted him that she was “going through a really bad relapse with [her] MS” and expressed 
concern that he was not letting her work unless she went against her doctor’s instructions not to 
drive.  (Ex. 24 to Opp’n, Lloyd and Stokes Text Messages, Doc. No. 46-25.)   
On July 6, Ms. Lloyd contacted human resources to request FMLA leave because her MS 
prevented her from driving.  (Ex. 25 to Opp’n, Lloyd Email to Sweat (July 6, 2016), Doc. No. 
46-26 at 1.)  She explained she could still work from home, but that her supervisor indicated her 
absences would be unexcused unless she reported to the office for work.  (Id.)  On July 18, Ms. 
Lloyd was approved for intermittent FMLA leave and was informed of the ADA process for the 
first time.  (Ex. 25 to Opp’n, Emails between Lloyd and Sweat (July 18, 2016), Doc. No. 46-26 
at 3; Lloyd Dep. 149:14–150:14, Doc. No. 46-9.)  On July 19, Ms. Lloyd requested Overstock’s 
ADA paperwork, stating “[a]ll I want to do is work but I’m being forced to use my FMLA 
because I can’t drive out there.”  (Ex. 25 to Opp’n, Lloyd Email to Sweat (July 19, 2016), Doc. 
No. 46-26 at 4.)  She submitted an ADA accommodation request form the same day.  (Ex. 10 to 
Opp’n, Application for Accommodation, Doc. No. 46-11.) 
On July 25, Mr. Stokes sent a chat message to Ms. Lloyd, telling her she must stop 
working from home.  (Ex. 19 to Opp’n, Lloyd and Stokes Chat (July 25, 2016), Doc. No. 46-20.)  
Although she told him she was “not able to drive due to medical issues,” he responded that she 
“was not approved to work from home” and would need to clock out and report to the office.  
(Id.)  However, on July 29, Overstock’s human resources director granted Ms. Lloyd a temporary 
work-from-home accommodation, which was made permanent in August.  (Ex. 12 to Opp’n, 
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Osterberg Email to Lloyd (July 29, 2016), Doc. No. 46-13 at 6; Ex. 26 to Opp’n, Osterberg 
Letter to Lloyd (Aug. 23, 2016), Doc. No. 46-27.) 
On August 1, Mr. Stokes informed Ms. Lloyd that he had been contacted about a review 
containing profanity which she had approved and, after a search, he found six instances of 
inappropriate reviews going back to April 2016.  (Ex. 15 to Opp’n, Stokes Email to Lloyd (Aug. 
1, 2016), Doc. No. 46-16.)  Ms. Lloyd testified it was not typical for Mr. Stokes to check her 
reviews so far back.  (Lloyd Dep. 157:2–6, Doc. No. 46-9.)  Although Mr. Stokes testified his 
supervisor had directed him to conduct the audit for all team members, his supervisor testified 
she left audits to his discretion.  (Stokes Dep. 33:14–24, 35:3–9, Doc. No. 46-6; Ex. 27 to Opp’n, 
Dep. of Leslie Killinger (“Killinger Dep.”) 46:9–14, Doc. No. 46-28.)  Mr. Stokes also testified 
he occasionally pulled recent reviews to check for errors but had no regular practice of doing so 
and, at times, went months without performing quality control checks.  (Stokes Dep. 30:19–24, 
31:21–32:7, Doc. No. 46-6.)   
On September 28, 2016, Ms. Lloyd raised concerns to Overstock about her 
accommodation and disability discrimination in a letter from the Disability Law Center.  (See Ex. 
28 to Opp’n, James Letter to EEOC (Sept. 22, 2017), Doc. No. 46-29 at 2.)  The next day, Mr. 
Stokes issued Ms. Lloyd a final warning for an additional five reviews with inappropriate 
language.  (Ex. 30 to Opp’n, Lloyd Final Warning, Doc. No. 46-31.)   
Ms. Lloyd was terminated on November 9, 2016.  (Ex. 17 to Opp’n, Lloyd Termination 
Letter, Doc. No. 46-18.)  The termination letter stated Ms. Lloyd had approved sixteen more 
reviews with inappropriate language since October 1, in addition to the previously identified 
inappropriate reviews.  (Id.)  The termination letter did not mention other performance issues.  
(Id.)   
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The CMT had guidelines for what constituted inappropriate content, but there were no 
standards to measure an employee’s accuracy in moderating reviews.  (Killinger Dep. 44:1–45:2, 
Doc. No. 46-28.)  Content moderators were expected to moderate one hundred reviews per hour.  
(Lloyd Dep. 36:10–14, Doc. No. 46-9; Stokes Dep. 27:15–22, 31:11–17, Doc. No. 46-6.)  
Overstock managers acknowledged it would be unrealistic to moderate with one-hundred percent 
accuracy.  (Killinger Dep. 44:17–45:13, Doc. No. 46-28; Lutz Dep. 25:14–26:5, Doc. No. 46-
15.)  Another moderator had also approved reviews with inappropriate content and had problems 
with productivity, but she was not terminated.  (Stokes Dep. 34:6–16, 112:7–113:13, Doc. No. 
46-6.) 
DISCUSSION 
 Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts four causes of action against Overstock for violations of the 
ADA: (1) failure to accommodate, (2) discrimination based on disparate treatment, 
(3) discrimination based on disparate impact, and (4) retaliation.  (Compl. ¶¶ 92–119, Doc. No. 
2.)  Overstock argues it is entitled to summary judgment on all claims.  (MSJ, Doc. No. 42.)  
Plaintiffs do not address Ms. Lloyd’s failure-to-accommodate claim or Plaintiffs’ disparate-
impact claims in their opposition brief, and they confirmed at the hearing they are not pursuing 
these claims.  (See Opp’n, Doc. No. 46.)  However, Plaintiffs argue the record evidence raises 
triable disputes of material fact on the remaining claims.  (Id.)   
For the reasons set forth below, Overstock is entitled to summary judgment on the claims 
Plaintiffs have chosen not to pursue: Ms. Lloyd’s failure-to-accommodate claim and Plaintiffs’ 
disparate-impact claims.  However, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to preclude 
summary judgment on the remaining claims: Ms. Shaw’s failure-to-accommodate claim, 
Plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims, and Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.    
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A. Failure to Accommodate 
To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case 
that “(1) she was disabled, (2) she was otherwise qualified, (3) she requested a plausibly 
reasonable accommodation, and (4) [the employer] refused to accommodate her disability.”  
Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2020).  If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden then shifts to the employer “to present evidence either (1) conclusively 
rebutting one or more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case or (2) establishing an affirmative 
defense, such as undue hardship or one of the other affirmative defenses available to the 
employer.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Overstock does not dispute Ms. Shaw and Ms. Lloyd were disabled and were otherwise 
qualified for the content moderator position.  (See MSJ 20–21, Doc. No. 42.)  Overstock also 
does not argue a work-from-home accommodation was unreasonable.  (See id.)  Accordingly, the 
court examines the other elements as they relate to each plaintiff.   
1. Ms. Shaw 
Overstock argues Ms. Shaw never requested an accommodation, pointing to her 
testimony that she did not “fill out an ADA application” or “request an ADA accommodation.”  
(MSJ 22, Doc. No. 42; Shaw Dep. 24:2–11, Doc. No. 46-3.)  Overstock also argues Ms. Shaw’s 
disability was accommodated because she “always worked from home,” from the beginning of 
her employment.  (MSJ 22, Doc. No. 42.)   
Plaintiffs argue Ms. Shaw’s testimony that she requested to continue working from home 
because she was too sick to drive raises a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she 
requested a reasonable accommodation.  (Opp’n 20–23, Doc. No. 46.)  Plaintiffs also argue 
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Overstock removed the preexisting work-from-home accommodation and refused to reinstate it 
when Ms. Shaw requested to continue working from home.  (Id. at 23–25.)     
A request for accommodation “does not have to be in writing, be made by the employee, 
or formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation,’” but “it nonetheless must 
make clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.”  Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1049 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).  “That is, the employer must know of both the 
disability and the employee’s desire for accommodations for that disability.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. Shaw requested 
an accommodation.  Ms. Shaw’s testimony that she did not specifically request an “ADA 
accommodation” is not determinative, because she was not required to reference the ADA or 
“formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable accommodation.’”  C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 
1049 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ms. Shaw testified she asked Mr. Stokes and Mr. Lutz 
to continue working from home and told them she couldn’t come into the office because she was 
too sick to drive.  (Shaw Dep. 36:22–37:19, 38:14–39:10, 43:17–20, Doc. No. 46-3.)  Her 
supervisors were aware of her disability and aware she worked from home because of her 
disability—indeed, Mr. Lutz acknowledged Ms. Shaw sometimes couldn’t drive because of it.  
(Lutz Dep. 52:24–54:13, Doc. No. 46-15; Stokes Dep. 82:5–9, Doc. No. 46-6.)  Given this 
context, Ms. Shaw’s statements were sufficient to put her supervisors on notice that she was 
requesting an accommodation for her disability.   
Plaintiffs have also presented sufficient evidence that Overstock refused to accommodate 
Ms. Shaw’s disability.  Although Ms. Shaw was hired into a position which accommodated her 
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MS by allowing her to work from home, the evidence supports a finding that Overstock removed 
this accommodation in June 2016.  Ms. Shaw was given a final warning stating she “will no 
longer work from home and is expected to work in the office.”  (Shaw Final Warning, Doc. No. 
46-34; see also Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  Ms. Shaw’s supervisor then denied 
her request to continue working from home because she was too sick to drive, instead telling her 
she must report to the office or be terminated.  (Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  The 
termination letter states “[s]he was told she could no longer work from home and must report to 
the office,” and that she was terminated because she “did not report to work.”  (Id.)  This 
evidence is sufficient to show Overstock refused to accommodate Ms. Shaw’s disability, by 
removing her preexisting work-from-home accommodation and denying her request to continue 
working from home.   
 The evidence set forth above, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Shaw, is 
sufficient to support a prima facie case that Overstock failed to accommodate Ms. Shaw’s 
disability.  Overstock has not presented any argument or evidence supporting affirmative 
defenses to this claim.  Accordingly, Overstock is not entitled to summary judgment on Ms. 
Shaw’s failure-to-accommodate claim. 
2. Ms. Lloyd 
Overstock argues Ms. Lloyd’s failure-to-accommodate claim fails because her request for 
an accommodation was granted and she was permitted to continue working from home until she 
was terminated.  (MSJ 22–23, Doc. No. 42.)  Plaintiffs did not address this claim in their 
opposition, and they confirmed at the hearing that Ms. Lloyd is not pursuing this claim.  Because 
of this and because Plaintiffs do not dispute Ms. Lloyd’s request for an accommodation was 
Case 2:18-cv-00955-DAO   Document 54   Filed 11/23/21   PageID.1232   Page 12 of 25
13 
 
eventually granted, Overstock is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Lloyd’s failure-to-
accommodate claim.   
B. Disparate Treatment 
To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination based on disparate treatment, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) she was disabled; (2) she was otherwise qualified; and (3) she 
“suffered discrimination by an employer . . . because of that disability.  C.R. England, 644 F.3d 
at 1037–38 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In order to demonstrate discrimination, a 
plaintiff generally must show that [she] has suffered an adverse employment action because of 
the disability.”  Id. at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “This requires some affirmative 
evidence that the disability was a determinative factor in [the employer’s] decision.”  Edmonds-
Radford v. Southwest Airlines Co., __ F.4th __, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33124, at *24 (10th Cir. 
2021). 
If a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, the court applies the burden-
shifting analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792 (1973).  See C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1038–39.  A plaintiff must first demonstrate a 
prima facie case of discrimination, as set forth above.  Id. at 1038 (citing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802).  The burden then “shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.”  Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 
802–03).  “If the defendant proffers such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant’s stated reasons are merely ‘pretextual.’”  Id. (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05).   
“A plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating the proffered reason is factually false, or 
that discrimination was a primary factor in the employer’s decision.”  Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 
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900 F.3d 1166, 1193 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “This is often 
accomplished by revealing weakness, implausibility, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered reason, such that a reasonable fact finder could deem 
the employer’s reason unworthy of credence.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Pretext 
may also be shown by providing direct evidence discrediting the proffered rationale, or by showing 
that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated.”  Jaramillo v. Adams 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14, 680 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
determining whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, the court “examine[s] the 
facts as they appear to the person making the decision.”  C.R. England, 644 F.3d at 1044 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).   
Overstock assumes, without conceding, that Plaintiffs can make a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment.  (MSJ 26, Doc. No. 42.)  But Overstock argues Ms. Shaw and Ms. Lloyd 
were terminated for poor performance and not for any discriminatory reason.  (Id. at 26–27.)  
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue the evidence supports an inference that Mr. Lutz and Mr. 
Stokes acted with discriminatory intent when they terminated Ms. Shaw and Ms. Lloyd, and that 
Overstock’s proffered reasons are pretextual.  (Opp’n 26–33, Doc. No. 46.)   
1. Ms. Shaw 
i. Prima Facie Case 
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case that Ms. Shaw 
was terminated because of her disability.  As discussed above, Ms. Shaw presented evidence that 
her supervisors were aware she worked from home due to her MS, but they informed her she was 
no longer allowed to work from home in June 2016.  (Lutz Dep. 52:24–54:13, Doc. No. 46-15; 
Stokes Dep. 82:5–9, Doc. No. 46-6; Shaw Final Warning, Doc. No. 46-34; Shaw Termination 
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Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  Despite her requests to continue working from home because she was 
too sick to drive, she was terminated for failing to report to the office.  (Shaw Dep. 36:22–37:19, 
38:14–39:10, 43:17–20, Doc. No. 46-3; Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  This 
evidence is sufficient to support a prima facie case that Ms. Shaw’s disability was a 
determinative factor in the termination decision.   
ii. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason 
Overstock argues Ms. Shaw was terminated for failing to communicate with her 
supervisor, not showing up for work when she said she would, and not telling her supervisor that 
she was not showing up for work, citing Mr. Lutz’s testimony that these reasons were “cause for 
termination.”  (MSJ 26–27, Doc. No. 42; Lutz Dep. 118:14–24, Doc. No. 46-15.)  Overstock also 
points to the termination letter’s statement that Ms. Shaw had seventeen unexcused absences in 
the final six months of her employment.  (MSJ 26, Doc. No. 42; Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. 
No. 46-5.)  With this evidence, Overstock has met its burden to proffer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.  Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
stated reasons are pretextual.   
iii. Pretext 
Plaintiffs argue Overstock’s proffered reasons for terminating Ms. Shaw are pretextual 
because (1) there is evidence Mr. Lutz and Mr. Stokes schemed to force Ms. Shaw to quit by 
ending the work-from-home policy; (2) Ms. Shaw’s termination letter stated she was terminated 
for failing to report to work rather than the performance issues identified in her final warning; 
(3) Mr. Lutz offered inconsistent accounts of his involvement in Ms. Shaw’s termination; and 
(4) Mr. Lutz and Mr. Stokes failed to follow Overstock’s accommodation and disciplinary 
policies.  (Opp’n 28–32, Doc. No. 46.) 
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Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of pretext.  As Plaintiffs 
note, the termination letter itself identified Ms. Shaw’s failure to report to work in the office, 
rather than other performance issues, as the reason for her termination.  (Shaw Termination 
Letter, Doc. No. 46-5.)  And, as described above, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Ms. 
Shaw’s supervisors were aware she worked from home due to her disability, yet they denied her 
accommodation request to continue working from home.  Given this context, a reasonable 
factfinder could infer Ms. Shaw’s supervisors acted with discriminatory intent when they 
terminated her for failing to report to the office.   
Notably, Overstock does not argue Ms. Shaw’s failure to report to the office—the reason 
stated the termination letter—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Shaw’s 
termination.  Instead, Overstock argued at the hearing that Ms. Shaw was actually terminated 
based on the performance issues identified in her final warning notice.  Overstock also claimed 
Ms. Shaw was never required to work in the office but, rather, was only required to come to the 
office for a meeting on the day she was terminated.  With these arguments, Overstock implicitly 
asks the court to draw inferences contrary to the plain language of the termination letter.  This 
would turn the summary judgment standard on its head.  The termination letter plainly states Ms. 
Shaw “was told she could no longer work from home and must report to the office,” was 
informed she would be terminated if she did not “report to the office by Wednesday 6/29/2016,” 
and was terminated because she “did not report to work.”  (Shaw Termination Letter, Doc. No. 
46-5.)  All inferences must be drawn in favor of Ms. Shaw as the nonmoving party.  But in this 
instance, no inferences are necessary—the court simply assumes the letter means what it says.   
Beyond the termination letter itself, Mr. Lutz’s email regarding ending the work-from-
home policy provides further evidence of discriminatory intent.  In his June 15 email, Mr. Lutz 
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recommended ending the work-from-home policy rather than going through the “formalities” of 
terminating Ms. Shaw for cause, stating his belief that Ms. Shaw would not “make the choice to 
come in to the office and work, and thus it solves that problem.”  (Lutz Email to Killinger (June 
15, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 3.)  Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Shaw, this supports a 
finding that Ms. Shaw’s supervisors intentionally removed her work-from-home 
accommodation—knowing her disability would prevent her from working in the office—in order 
to end her employment.   
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence undermining Overstock’s claim that Ms. Shaw 
was terminated based on prior unexcused absences.  Ms. Simon, Ms. Shaw, Ms. Lloyd, and 
another employee testified that content moderators had flexible schedules without set hours and 
did not have to be logged into the system at any specific time.  (Leary Dep. 7:24–8:17, Doc. No. 
46-2; Shaw Dep. 26:8–22, Doc. No. 46-3; Simon Dep. 98:20–99:13, Doc. No. 46-4; Lloyd Dep. 
35:24–36:3, Doc. No. 46–9.)  This suggests Ms. Shaw could not accrue unexcused absences and 
provides further support for a finding that the proffered reasons were pretextual.  
Overstock argues it could not have acted with discriminatory intent because it allowed 
another content moderator with MS to continue working from home after Mr. Noursalehi’s 
email ending the work-from-home policy.  (MSJ 31–32, Doc. No. 42.)  Overstock asserts the 
only difference between Ms. Shaw and the other employee is that Ms. Shaw had performance 
issues.  (Id. at 32.)  However, in his email recommending ending the work-from-home policy, 
Mr. Lutz explained that an exception could be made for this other employee because she only 
worked a few hours per week.  (Lutz Email to Killinger (June 15, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 3.)  
Regardless, Ms. Shaw need not show that Overstock discriminated against every employee with 
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MS, but only that discrimination was a “primary factor” in her own termination.  See Lincoln, 
900 F.3d at 1193.  The evidence set forth above is sufficient to support such a finding.  
Overstock also argues it could not have discriminated against Plaintiffs because 
“Overstock is a friend to the disabled,” pointing to the fact that Overstock specifically 
recruited people with disabilities to work in a department which accommodated them.  (MSJ 
27–28, Doc. No. 42.)  However, a general policy of recruiting and accommodating disabled 
employees is insufficient to show, as a matter of law, that Overstock did not discriminate 
against specific disabled employees.  Moreover, Plaintiffs have presented evidence these 
policies were established by former Overstock president Stormy Simon and dismantled when 
she left, shortly before Plaintiffs were terminated.  The same month Ms. Simon took a leave of 
absence, Overstock ended the work-from-home policy on the CMT, even though the CMT 
supervisors knew Ms. Shaw and Ms. Lloyd worked from home because of their MS.  Indeed, a 
stated goal of ending the work-from-home policy was forcing Ms. Shaw to resign.  Thus, 
Overstock’s prior recruitment and accommodation of disabled employees is insufficient to 
establish as a matter of law that Overstock did not discriminate against Plaintiffs when it 
terminated them.  
For these reasons, Overstock is not entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Shaw’s 
disparate-treatment claim.  Because the above evidence supports a finding of pretext, the court 
need not address Plaintiffs’ other arguments.   
2. Ms. Lloyd 
i. Prima Facie Case 
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case that Ms. Lloyd 
was terminated because of her disability.  Plaintiffs presented evidence from which 
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discriminatory intent could be inferred, including Mr. Stokes’ testimony that employees like Ms. 
Lloyd were “dumped” on his team and that he had difficulty working with her because of her 
health issues.  (Stokes Dep. 17:19–23, 19:18–19, 22:3–13, 97:22–25, Doc. No. 46-6.)  
Additionally, even though he knew Ms. Lloyd worked from home due to her MS, Mr. Lutz 
expressed that he would be excited to replace Ms. Lloyd if ending the work-from-home policy 
caused her to resign.  (Lutz Email to Killinger (June 15, 2016), Doc. No. 46-22 at 3.)  These 
statements support an inference of discriminatory animus toward Ms. Lloyd due to her disability.  
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence that Mr. Stokes began scrutinizing Ms. Lloyd’s 
work for moderation errors—which were later cited as the reason for her termination—after Mr. 
Stokes initially refused to allow her to continue working from home, and only days after her 
accommodation request was approved by human resources.  The timing of these events supports 
an inference that Ms. Lloyd’s supervisors chose to terminate her rather than allow her to continue 
working from home with a disability accommodation.   
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Lloyd as the nonmoving party, this evidence is 
sufficient to support a prima facie case that Ms. Lloyd was terminated because of her disability. 
ii. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason 
Overstock claims Ms. Lloyd was terminated for performance issues, including poor 
communication, not “hitting [Overstock’s] preferred numbers,” and making moderation errors.  
(See MSJ 27–28, Doc. No. 42.)  Because Overstock has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for termination, the burden shifts to Ms. Lloyd to demonstrate these reasons were 
pretextual.  




Ms. Lloyd argues Overstock’s proffered reasons are pretextual because (1) prior 
productivity and communication issues were resolved before her termination; (2) Mr. Stokes 
scrutinized Ms. Lloyd’s work for moderation errors only after her accommodation request was 
granted; (3) her moderation error rate was less than one percent; and (4) another employee who 
had made similar errors was not terminated.  (Opp’n 37–41, Doc. No. 46.)  
Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Overstock’s 
proffered reasons were pretextual.  First, Ms. Lloyd’s final warning and termination letter do not 
mention productivity or communication issues.  (Lloyd Final Warning, Doc. No. 46-31; Lloyd 
Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-18.)  Ms. Lloyd received a written warning for poor 
productivity and communication in 2015, but a subsequent performance review in March 2016 
indicated these issues were resolved.  (Ex. 13 to Opp’n, Lloyd Written Warning (Oct. 21, 2015), 
Doc. No. 46-14; Ex. 6 To Opp’n, Lloyd Performance Review (March 25, 2016), Doc. No. 46-7 
at 1.)  This evidence supports a finding that these issues were not the basis for Ms. Lloyd’s 
termination. 
Second, Ms. Lloyd presented evidence suggesting the reason for termination stated in her 
termination letter—her approval of reviews with profanity—was unworthy of credence.  Based 
on the expected rate of one hundred reviews per hour, Ms. Lloyd estimates she moderated more 
than one hundred thousand reviews during the time period in which inappropriate reviews were 
identified, meaning she had an error rate of less than one percent when she was terminated.  
(Opp’n 39–40, Doc. No. 42; see also Lloyd Dep. 36:10–14, Doc. No. 46-9; Stokes Dep. 27:15–
22, 31:11–17, Doc. No. 46-6; Lloyd Termination Letter, Doc. No. 46-18.)  Ms. Lloyd also 
presented evidence that there were no set standards for moderation accuracy, CMT supervisors 
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did not expect one-hundred percent accuracy, and another employee who approved reviews with 
profanity was not terminated.  (Killinger Dep. 44:1–45:13, Doc. No. 46-28; Lutz Dep. 25:14–
26:5, Doc. No. 46-15; Stokes Dep. 34:6–16, 112:7–113:13, Doc. No. 46-6.)  This evidence 
undermines Overstock’s proffered justification and supports a finding of pretext. 
 Finally, as set forth above, Ms. Lloyd has presented other evidence suggesting her 
supervisors were motivated by discriminatory animus, including Mr. Stokes’ testimony that 
employees like Ms. Lloyd were “dumped” on his team, and the fact that he began scrutinizing 
her work for errors only days after human resources granted Ms. Lloyd’s accommodation request 
over his prior denials.  This evidence gives rise to an inference that Mr. Stokes was motivated by 
discriminatory intent and used moderation errors as a pretext to terminate Ms. Lloyd.  
For these reasons, Overstock is not entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Lloyd’s 
disparate-treatment claim.  
C. Disparate Impact 
To prove disability discrimination based on disparate impact, a plaintiff must show “a 
specific policy caused a significant disparate effect on a protected group.”  Reinhart v. Lincoln 
Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  Overstock argues 
Plaintiffs have no evidence to support a disparate-impact claim.  (MSJ 25, Doc. No. 42.)  
Plaintiffs did not address this claim in their opposition, and they confirmed at the hearing they 
are not pursuing this claim.  Because Plaintiffs have not offered evidence supporting this claim, 
Overstock is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim.   
D. Retaliation 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show 
(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action by her 
Case 2:18-cv-00955-DAO   Document 54   Filed 11/23/21   PageID.1241   Page 21 of 25
22 
 
employer either after or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.  Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. 
Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2010).  A request for accommodation is a protected 
activity under the ADA.  Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1209.  A causal connection may be inferred based 
on close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action.  Anderson v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999); Ramirez v. Okla. Dep’t of Mental 
Health, 41 F.3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1994).  A plaintiff may also demonstrate causation by 
showing a pattern of retaliatory conduct beginning shortly after the protected activity and 
culminating in termination.  Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir. 1996).  Where a 
plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to establish a retaliation claim, the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework applies.  Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1209.   
1. Ms. Shaw 
i. Prima Facie Case 
Overstock argues Ms. Shaw did not engage in a protected activity because she never 
requested an accommodation.  (MSJ 30, Doc. No. 42.)  However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs 
have presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. Shaw requested the 
accommodation of continuing to work from home after she was told she could no longer do so in 
June 2016.  This evidence is sufficient to show Ms. Shaw engaged in a protected activity.    
Plaintiffs have also presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal connection 
between Ms. Shaw’s protected activity and her termination.  Ms. Shaw was informed she could 
no longer work from home on June 23, 2016, and she was terminated on June 29, 2016.  During 
that time, Ms. Shaw requested the accommodation of continuing to work from home, and she 
was terminated only days later.  This close temporal proximity between her accommodation 
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request and her termination is evidence of a causal connection.  Plaintiffs also presented 
evidence that Ms. Shaw’s supervisors resented the work-from-home accommodations provided 
to CMT employees and asked to end the work-from-home policy with the stated goal of forcing 
Ms. Shaw to resign.  Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Shaw, this evidence supports an 
inference that Ms. Shaw was terminated in retaliation for using the work-from-home 
accommodation and for requesting that this accommodation continue. 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to support a prima facie 
case of retaliation for Ms. Shaw.  
ii. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext 
Overstock argues Ms. Shaw was terminated solely based on performance issues.  As set 
forth above in the discussion of her disparate-impact claim, Ms. Shaw presented sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Overstock’s proffered reasons for the termination were 
pretextual, including the fact that the termination letter identified her failure to report to work in 
the office as the reason for her termination.  Accordingly, Overstock is not entitled to summary 
judgment on Ms. Shaw’s retaliation claim.  
2. Ms. Lloyd 
i. Prima Facie Case 
Overstock acknowledges Ms. Lloyd requested an accommodation but argues this request 
had nothing to do with her termination.  (MSJ 30, Doc. No. 42.)  However, Plaintiffs presented 
evidence that Ms. Lloyd’s last protected activity occurred when she complained of 
discrimination on September 28, 2016.  (See James Letter to EEOC (Sept. 22, 2017), Doc. No. 
46-29 at 2.)  The temporal proximity between this complaint and her termination on November 
9, 2016, a month and a half later, is evidence of a causal connection sufficient to support a prima 
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facie case.  See Ramirez, 41 F.3d at 596 (finding a causal connection could be inferred where an 
adverse action occurred within a month and a half of an employee’s protected activity).  
Plaintiffs have also presented evidence of a pattern of retaliatory conduct culminating in Ms. 
Lloyd’s termination, including evidence that Mr. Stokes began scrutinizing her work for 
moderation errors mere days after human resources granted her accommodation request, and 
ultimately cited moderation errors as the reason for her termination several months later.  This 
evidence provides additional support for a prima facie case of retaliation for Ms. Lloyd.   
ii. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext 
Overstock argues Ms. Lloyd was terminated solely due to performance issues, including 
poor communication, low productivity, and moderation errors.  (MSJ 30–31, Doc. No. 42.)  As 
set forth above in the discussion of her disparate-impact claim, Ms. Lloyd has presented 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Overstock’s proffered reasons for the termination 
were pretextual, including evidence that her error rate was less than one percent and that prior 
performance issues were resolved.  For these reasons, Overstock is not entitled to summary 
judgment on Ms. Lloyd’s retaliation claim.  
CONCLUSION 
 Where Plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient supporting evidence in favor of Ms. Lloyd’s 
failure-to-accommodate claim and Plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claims, the court GRANTS 
Overstock’s motion and enters summary judgment in favor of Overstock on these claims.  
However, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the court DENIES Overstock’s 
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motion as to Ms. Shaw’s failure-to-accommodate claim, Plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims, 
and Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims. 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2021. 




Daphne A. Oberg 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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